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core or base support of any candidate would be his/
her kin group and such support could be main-
tained over successive elections, even without big 
campaign budgets. 
The first part of the paper deals with models 
that have been used by scholars and researchers to 
discuss political behaviour in Solomon Islands and 
the shortfalls associated with using these models to 
describe the politics of the constituency. I also dis-
cuss the kin-based model and its appropriateness 
for understanding constituency politics in this sec-
tion. The second part of the paper discusses social 
organisation and traditional gifting in East AreAre. 
The last part deals with the implications of kin-
based social organisation for constituency politics 
in East AreAre and Solomon Islands more generally. 
Theorising Solomon Islands Constituency Politics
In discussing voting behaviour in Solomon Islands 
constituency politics, scholars have used cultural, 
rational or clientilist arguments to explain gifting 
and political affiliation during elections. Although 
these approaches have some distinctive features, 
they also offer intertwining explanations and gener-
ally agree on a correlation between benefits/incen-
tives and voting behaviour. These models agree that 
voters are likely to support candidates who offer 
benefits and incentives.
Drawn from the field of economics, the ‘ration-
al choice theory’ views the exchange between can-
didates and voters as equivalent to an economic 
activity, where voter decisions are benefit or gain-
oriented. Political actors are therefore seen as 
choosing political relationships (making choices 
between candidates) that will ben-
efit them the most. As Downs 
(1957:137) argues: ‘Every agent … 
undertakes only those actions for 
which marginal return exceeds mar-
Despite the claim that money and especially Rural 
Constituency Development Fund (RCDF) dis-
bursement have played a major role in influencing 
political choices in the Solomon Islands national 
parliamentary elections (Commonwealth Secre-
tariat 2014:3, 5; Cox 2015; Hague 2012; Haley and 
Zubrinich 2015; Morgan 2005:4; Wood 2014a), 
empirical evidence and election data suggest that 
political alliances in some rural constituencies are 
based more on kin relationship rather than gift 
exchanges and RCDF disbursements. Although 
gifting has attracted a lot of attention in the discus-
sions about politics and elections in the Solomon 
Islands, it is kin relationship (more than anything 
else) that forms the basis for political alliances in 
the constituency politics. In the rural areas where 
social organisation is kin-based and institutions 
like the extended family or clan still play an impor-
tant role in the lives of individuals, it is the social 
and biological bond between members and their 
loyalty to these institutions that set the foundation 
for collective political action and allegiance.
This paper is based on the work I did for my 
MA thesis and has used (beside election results) 
data from the fieldwork I carried out in East 
AreAre, Malaita Province, in 2013. I have also 
relied on my knowledge of the region, its people 
and culture to discuss social organisation and its 
influence on political affiliation and allegiance in 
the politics of the rural constituency. More gener-
ally, I have reinterpreted the correlation between 
gifting and voting behaviour using a kin-based 
model. This model advances two arguments that 
form the core of the paper. First, kin relationship 
forms the basis for collective political actions and 
allegiance in rural constituency politics. Secondly, 
gifting when isolated from kin relationship does 
not have the significant impact it is often accorded. 
The kin-based model therefore contends that the 
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ginal cost’.
In using the rational choice argument to explain 
gifting and voting behaviour in Solomon Islands, 
proponents of ‘rational choice’ draw attention to the 
economic hardships faced by voters (rather than 
irrational allegiance and mere adherence to cultural 
norms) as a major factor shaping voter choices 
and alliances. For instance, Tobias Haque argues 
that voter behaviour (in Solomon Islands) ‘reflects 
the broader economic context’ where there is little 
opportunity to earn money (2012:3). He maintains 
that voters’ focus on short-term benefits cannot be 
justified using a cultural explanation or attributing 
it to irrational loyalty. 
Likewise, some scholars have used a clientil-
ist framework to describe the voter tendency to 
support candidates who provide personal benefits 
or localised public goods. The clientilist theory 
derives from a medieval European phenomenon 
that describes the relationship between landlords 
and tenants. The theory of clientilism has gained 
popularity following a renewed interest in clientil-
ist relationships and their impact on western-style 
public institutions and processes in new democra-
cies (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002:1; De Sousa 
2008:3). Similar clientilist relationships can also 
be found in contemporary Latin American and 
Asian countries. In Melanesia, the concept has been 
widely used to describe voter loyalty supposedly 
influenced by the ability of candidates to offer per-
sonal benefits (and sometimes community goods) 
to voters. In writing about Solomon Islands poli-
tics and elections, Wood (2015:3) says that: ‘voter 
behaviour in Solomon Islands is strongly clientilist 
… in that voter behaviour is based around contin-
gent exchange’. He further argues that it is typical of 
Solomon Islands voters to support candidates they 
think will provide personal assistance and local 
community support during their term in parlia-
ment (Wood 2014c). While the clientilist frame-
work also sees voter decisions as rational, this does 
not necessarily mean that voters make decisions 
based on maximum offers. 
In Melanesia, clientilism is also said to be 
intertwined with personal relationships/networks 
thus adding an individualised aspect to voting and 
political support. Jonathan Hopkin in discussing 
clientilism in electoral politics argues that: ‘patrons 
… stand for election and their clients vote for them 
sometimes out of a sense of obligation and attach-
ment’ (2006:3). Voters therefore support individual 
candidates rather than political parties and, in 
return, candidates furnish voters with private goods 
rather than public ones. 
Finally, some scholars attribute aspects of the 
gifting practice and voter behaviour in modern pol-
itics to cultural practices assumed to be characteris-
tic of traditional Melanesian leadership and culture 
(Morgan 2005:5; Wood 13/8/2012). This approach 
is common where scholars believe that aspects 
of the learnt culture of a society permeate mod-
ern politics and governance structures. De Sousa 
(2008:7), for instance, argues that: ‘Cultural atti-
tudes shape the normative environment in which 
clientilist practices take place’. 
Supporters of the cultural thesis say that people 
enter politics not as blank slates but are conditioned 
by the culture and society in which they grow up. 
For the supporters of the cultural thesis, the learnt 
attitudes and values will always transpose to other 
arenas of life and, in this case, to that of modern 
politics (Anderson and Tverdova 2003:93; Kweit 
and Kweit 1981:61).
The core argument of the cultural approach 
is tied to the traditional Melanesian Bigman phe-
nomenon and its associated reciprocal culture. The 
model, made popular by Marshal Sahlins (1963), 
asserts that Melanesian traditional leaders attain 
authority by distributing wealth to followers, thus 
earning their loyalty. Likewise, candidates and 
members of parliament (MPs) are seen as modern 
Bigmen who maintain followers by giving them 
gifts and incentives, and in return voters pledge 
their support. In supporting the cultural argu-
ment, Michael Morgan (2005:4) writes that: ‘Most 
analyses of the state in Melanesia suggest that pre-
existing social forms pervade the state at almost 
every level’. Sinclair Dinnen (2008:57) also says 
that, in the case of Solomon Islands: ‘Skilful distri-
bution of resources and manipulation of relation-
ship by modern politicians are reminiscent of older 
Melanesian leadership strategies’. Therefore, for the 
supporters of the cultural thesis, culture will always 
influence the way politics is done and the kind of 
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democracy a country has (Lane and Errson 2005).
Undoing the theories 
Although the rational choice argument explains 
some political relationships in Solomon Islands 
constituency politics, the theory cannot adequately 
describe the general behaviour of the voting popu-
lation of a constituency. A rational approach seems 
fine when applied to the relationship and exchanges 
between incumbent MPs or rich candidates and 
supporters. The rational argument falls short, how-
ever, when one considers other strong contend-
ers who are also able to attract large followings 
without a large budget or access to state resources 
like constituency development funds. Even more 
striking, these candidates seem able to maintain 
their support over two or three elections. Because 
most candidates get their share of the constituency 
votes during elections, winners of elections do so 
on a very low vote count, sometimes receiving less 
than 20 per cent of the constituency votes (Wood 
2015:3). This alludes firstly to a single factor that 
works in favour of all candidates — those who have 
a lot to spend during elections and candidates with 
limited resources. Secondly, it also points to a very 
fragmented voting population that does not allow 
political support to converge on only two of the big 
players (as according to Duverger’s Law). 
Furthermore, the argument that voters read-
ily support candidates who offer gifts or incentives 
is not always borne out in reality. Although voters 
accept gifts from candidates, they do not always 
pledge allegiance or loyalty to the giver. In writing 
about politics in Mt Hagen, Papua New Guinea, 
Ketan (2004:343) says: ‘The use of cash … is a 
major factor in elections, but it must be used clev-
erly because handouts do not automatically open 
eyes or win votes’.
Ketan is alluding to the fact that gifts, whether 
in cash or kind, do not always forge political rela-
tionships. The problem has been that the exchange 
between candidates and voters in modern politics 
is assumed to work in a similar manner to the Big-
man model. In so doing, the acceptance of gifts is 
often taken to mean political support when indeed 
a lot of voters who accept gifts from candidates 
may not reciprocate them at all. For instance, in 
the East AreAre constituency election petition case 
(Ha’apio v Hanaria [2011] SBHC 117; HCSI-CC 343 
of 2010 — 7 December 2011), witnesses confirmed 
that gifts were retrieved from recipients when it 
was established that they did not vote for the giver 
(Andrew Hanaria Keniasina). Such incidents chal-
lenge the argument that gifts necessarily bring 
about political loyalty and allegiance, as supported 
by rational and clientilist approaches. 
Of course this is not to suggest that all voters 
within Solomon Islands constituencies cast their 
votes based only on a single type of social relation-
ship. As discussed in the next section and illustrat-
ed in Figure 1, political choices could also be based 
on rational decisions, sound policies, religious affil-
iations or even employment experiences. However, 
such support is usually small for most candidates 
and choices based on ideologies are often scarce. 
Most candidates find it difficult to get votes beyond 
their home polling booths without strong and influ-
ential campaign managers (Hiriasia 2016). 
The Kin-based Voting Model
The kin-based model differs from the rational 
choice, clientilist and cultural approaches in that its 
focus is not on the correlation between gifting and 
political behaviour but rather on how kin relation-
ship affects voting behaviour. It draws attention to 
the use of kin relationship (rather than gifting) as 
a platform for political cooperation and alliance 
in constituency politics. The model sees gifting as 
embedded within kin-based social organisation and 
kin networking and that, on its own, gifting does 
not always bring about political loyalty, as often 
assumed. The kin-based model therefore sees gift-
ing as effective only when practised within a kin-
group. As such, when candidates or campaign man-
agers give to non-kin voters, there is no guarantee 
that they will reciprocate the gift.
In kin-based politics, because the kin group 
is more (if not the most) important, candidates as 
well as campaign managers must properly coordi-
nate and mobilise kin groups for political support. 
Therefore, the core of a candidate’s support would 
be kin-based; whether that of the candidate or cam-
paign manager. This also means that outside of kin 
groups, the impact of gifting is always uncertain. 
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In a lot of cases, candidates (especially newcomers) 
give sparingly in these uncertain zones (non-kin 
territories) handing out small amounts of money 
while bigger gifts, such as solar panels or even iron 
roofing, are reserved for kin members whose loyal-
ty is unquestioned (Hiriasia 2016). In this context, 
the terms kin bases and support bases1 are usually 
synonymous (see the discussion on the AreAre tra-
ditional gifting) in that kin bases are also likely to 
be the major support bases of candidates. See the 
kin-based voting model below.
In the kin-based voting model shown in Figure 1, 
the core of a candidate’s total vote count would be 
made up of kin votes: those of the candidate and 
the campaign managers. Although gifting takes 
place at this level, collective political action is based 
more on kinship and social ties rather than mere 
rational decisions. Even when campaign manag-
ers duplicate the kin-based support in their own 
areas (second layer of kin support), voters pledge 
allegiance to the campaign managers and not so 
much the candidates. Voters therefore shift support 
with the allegiance of the campaign managers. The 
third layer of support comprises rational voters: 
those who support policies and religious doctrines 
and victims of the ‘devil’s night’.2 This (third) layer 
of support usually varies for each candidate and 
it is quite rare to find support based on ideologies 
or religious affiliations. Having said that, in a con-
text where most candidates have the backing of kin 
groups, those who have consistent pockets of sup-
porters beyond kin bases will increase their chances 
of winning. As is obvious in Figure 2, Michael 
Ahikau (the runner-up in the 2006 election) main-
tained a consistent support in polling stations 
beyond his kin base, while Abraham Namokari 
received little support outside his kin base. The out-
side support as such varies for each candidate and 
is at times solely dependent on the work of cam-
paign managers.
Kin Groups and Political Support
The use of kin groups as a political platform is 
noted elsewhere in Melanesia. For instance, in writ-
ing about the case of Western Highlands Province 
in Papua New Guinea, Ketan argues that candi-
dates rely on kin/tribal and individual networks to 
succeed in elections (2013:4). Kabutaulaka (1998) 
Figure 1: The kin-based voting model.
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also points out in the case of Solomon Islands that 
political support for a candidate starts with the kin 
or tribal group before extending to others within a 
constituency. The kin-based voting is sometimes 
referred to as ethnic-based3 voting (Wood 2015:3; 
2014c). 
Because political support is kin-based, it is 
common for candidates to pick up most of their 
votes at home polling booths (their villages and kin 
bases) and little support beyond that. As is obvi-
ous in Figure 2, Abraham Namokari who is from 
Hunanawa received most of his votes at his home 
polling station and those nearby, where he has kin 
ties, and very little beyond Tawanaora polling sta-
tion. Likewise, Michael Ahikau who is from Mas-
upa also picked most of his votes at Masupa and 
nearby polling stations, as well as at Potani’u where 
he has maternal ties. 
Furthermore, because political support is kin-
based, even candidates who do not have access to 
state resources such as the RCDF can also maintain 
strong and consistent kin support for over two or 
three elections (Hiriasia 2016). Conversely, there 
are numerous examples of incumbent MPs who 
despite having access to huge resources and espe-
cially the RCDF failed to attract significant support 
beyond their home polling booths. This suggests 
that there is a weak correlation at best between 
political support and incentives or benefits. It is in 
this regard that I see a kin-based approach as offer-
ing a more realistic explanation of the general vot-
ing behaviour at the constituency level. 
East AreAre Constituency 
East AreAre Constituency is important as a case to 
study for two reasons. First, it is an example of a 
rural constituency where there is little evidence of 
the presence of a central or provincial government. 
Except for schools (most of which are community 
schools4) and a few clinics and aid posts that pro-
vide very basic health services to the East AreAre 
people, there is little on the ground that suggests 
the work or the presence of a government. With-
out a strong presence, the government (central and 
provincial) becomes irrelevant to the lives of the 
people. As White (2007:4) rightly highlights in the 
case of Pacific Island states, ‘it is arguable that the 
region’s newly independent governments never suc-
ceeded in establishing a strong presence in rural 
communities’.
To a certain extent, this resonates with Almond 
and Verba’s (1963) parochial culture where citizens 
have little awareness of a central government. In 
their study of political culture across five countries, 
Figure 2: 2006 election results for Michael Ahikau and Abraham Namokari.
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Almond and Verba concluded that in a parochial 
culture, citizens are largely unaware of the political 
system and hence their role in the system. Moreo-
ver, in a parochial culture, citizens have few expec-
tations of the government. Similarly, in the case 
of East AreAre, detachment from the government 
generally shapes the political culture of the people 
and how they see and relate to government. 
Second, East AreAre constituency is an exam-
ple of a rural constituency where the lack of gov-
ernment presence results in local institutions and 
structures asserting themselves in the constituency 
politics. In AreAre and more generally across Solo-
mon Islands, local groups and institutions have 
remained an important platform for social organi-
sation and cooperation and play a major role in 
the everyday life of individuals. White (2007:5), for 
instance, states that ‘local groups are highly val-
ued’. In particular, kin networks have become an 
important platform for collective social and politi-
cal action. During elections, kin networks have 
also been mobilised to support kin candidates. As 
pointed out by Kabutaulaka (1998:133) concerning 
political support in the Solomon Islands: ‘Politi-
cal allegiances are based around kinship and tribal 
group before extending to the wider community. In 
elections the foundation for political support is kin-
ship and tribal group’.
My research suggests that this observation 
holds true in East AreAre, where kin groups have 
been a popular platform for political organisation 
and remain central to the dynamics of constitu-
ency politics. The lessons learnt in using a kin-
based approach to understand the dynamics of East 
AreAre politics can also help explain voting behav-
iour in Solomon Islands constituency politics more 
broadly.
AreAre in Post-Independence National Politics
The AreAre region is best known in Solomon 
Islands political history for the movement called 
Maasina Ruru (Maasina Rule). Led by Alick 
Nono’ohimae, Nori and Hoasihau, the move-
ment was a result of continuous local resistance 
to colonial leadership combined with a new view 
of colonialism born mainly out of the encounter 
with American soldiers during World War Two 
(Akin 2013:164; Bennett 1987:293). At its core, the 
objective of the Maasina Ruru movement was to 
gain autonomy from the British colonial govern-
ment and, more generally, for Solomon Islanders to 
form their own government and to apply kastom5 
in their own courts to settle disputes. By the end 
of 1946, the movement extended beyond Malaita 
and attracted followers on some of the other major 
islands (Laracy 1983:22). 
In the decades prior to and after independence, 
AreAre individuals continued to play an active 
role in the local politics. The most notable were Sir 
David Kausimae and Sir Peter Kenilorea. The for-
mer was elected to the Legislative Council as the 
South Malaita representative in 1967 and played an 
active role in the post-independence politics until 
his retirement in the late 1980s. In the 1976 general 
election, East AreAre became a separate constituen-
cy; Sir Peter Kenilorea became its first member of 
parliament, having stood unopposed in that general 
election, going on to become the chief minister that 
year (Bennett 1987:322). He retained the seat in the 
1980 election and continued to hold the seat until 
his resignation in 1991.
Following Peter Kenilorea’s resignation, Edward 
Huniehu was elected as the new member of parlia-
ment in a by-election held that year. Two years later 
(in 1993), he was re-elected in the national general 
elections and held office until 1997. In the 1997 
election, Dickson Warakohia won the seat, only to 
be replaced by Edward Huniehu in the 2001 elec-
tion. He then held onto the constituency seat until 
his death in 2009. In the 2010 election the seat was 
won by Andrew Hanaria, although he lost it in a 
petition in 2012 (Wood 13/8/2012). A by-election 
was held that year (2012) and the seat was won by 
Andrew Manepora’a. He was re-elected in the 2014 
election. 
In the post-independence politics of East 
AreAre, Kenilorea and Huniehu between them 
shared 31 years as MPs for the seat while Warako-
hia, Hanaria and Manepora’a shared the other 9 
years. Interestingly, both Kenilorea and Huniehu 
enjoyed extensive6 kin connections across the con-
stituency. Even Dickson Warakohia, who won the 
seat for a single term in 1997, is a close relative of 
Peter Kenilorea and had capitalised on the same kin 
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connections for election victory. His support, how-
ever, declined in the 2001 and 2006 elections as kin 
candidates split the same vote bases in the northern 
and central polling stations. The election results 
prior to the 2010 election therefore suggest a strong 
correlation between extensive kin connection/net-
works and election success. 
It is also important to note that this trend has 
been changing since the 2010 election and can-
didates who lack extensive kin connections have 
been making up for this shortfall by duplicating kin 
alliances outside their own kin territories through 
their campaign managers. This was probably 
because none of the candidates who ran in the 2010 
election had the extensive kin networks similar to 
that of Peter Kenilorea or Edward Huniehu. This 
has not only added a new dimension to the politi-
cal competition in East AreAre but has also seen 
campaign managers taking on a bigger and more 
important role during elections. Kin relationship, 
whether the candidates’ or campaign managers’, is 
still a very influential factor in East AreAre con-
stituency politics.
Social Structure and Political Organisation in AreAre
In order to understand political behaviour in East 
AreAre contemporary politics, it is necessary to 
look at the individual (iinoni) and his/her position 
within larger social units such as the extended fam-
ily and clan or tribe. AreAre culture puts emphasis 
on membership of bigger social units. This relation-
ship is not only important for land and property 
ownership but also determines alliances for social 
events such as feasts, marriages, other communal 
activities and political organisation. In contempo-
rary politics and especially in the politics of the 
constituency, alliances and political groupings start 
with the kin group.
Moreover, in AreAre, social organisation is very 
much tied to the land tenure system which draws a 
parallel between the concept of the canoe and the 
land. Thus in AreAre the term used for canoe is 
iirora which is also the same term used for the big-
gest land unit. The term arata literally refers to a 
section within a canoe, likewise in AreAre land ten-
ure arata also refers to sub-divisions within a bigger 
plot of land.
Figure 3: Comparison between the design of a traditional canoe and the land tenure system in AreAre.
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Figure 3 demonstrates how the concept of 
a canoe is applied to the land tenure system in 
AreAre. The lower diagram represents a plot of 
land and the lines dividing the aratas can be valleys 
or rivers. Iirora in AreAre land tenure can cover 
quite a large area and the region being mountain-
ous, an iirora usually covers a whole mountain 
range. Valleys, ridges or rivers/streams are used to 
mark the boundaries between each arata. While 
sometimes the number of arata can reach four, 
most iirora have only three. Also, the aratas are 
arranged sequentially and there is an arata na’ona 
iirora (arata in front of the canoe) as well as an 
arata purina iirora (arata at the back of canoe). The 
clear demarcation of tribal areas (arata) in AreAre 
means that people only settle or work where they 
have connections to the land.
Arata also refers to an institution of which 
those owning an arata (a plot of land within the 
iirora) are members. The term can therefore be 
used interchangeably to refer to a plot of land and 
the institution that owns and governs it. Although 
the concept of arata translates more closely to the 
western idea of tribe, it differs to an extent in that it 
must be used with reference to land ownership. As 
such, the term arata not only refers to a group of 
related people but also a group of people who own 
the same plot of land. In AreAre, traditional gifting 
and social organisation takes place within the arata. 
Traditional Gifting in AreAre
In AreAre, gifting is known as waiaraha or tauri-
hina. The term waiaraha translates more as ‘con-
tribution’ than ‘gifting’ and it shows how AreAre 
people perceive gifting. Waiaraha or taurihina (as 
the practice is known in bride-price payments) are 
in fact contributions collected from members of 
the extended family and tribe toward the hosting 
of a feast, payment of a bride or other communal 
events. Although kin members are not compelled 
to waiara or to give, the expectation that everyone 
should participate renders the practice compulsory. 
Moreover, those who do not actively participate 
in such events are often ostracised and stand the 
chance of hosting such events alone. When seen in 
this light, the concept of waiaraha (or gifting) in 
AreAre is comparable to resource pooling, where 
parties put together resources to host an event, 
solve a problem or address a need. 
The purpose of traditional gifting is therefore 
social and economic rather than political. Even 
those who do not have political aspirations pool 
resources to secure the cooperation of the kin 
group. However, for those with a political agenda, 
participation within these organised events can 
prove useful for political cooperation and most 
candidates utilise their kin connections for politi-
cal support during elections. It is also important to 
know that gifting in AreAre occurs mainly within 
the kin network and when it extends beyond kin 
boundaries it results from marriage and the rela-
tionship is known as aahorota. The basis for gifting 
in AreAre is therefore kin relationship and, in this 
context, gifting is only warranted by the relation-
ship.
Kin Relationship and its Implications for East 
AreAre Constituency Politics
Kin relationship is a very dominant feature of 
East AreAre constituency politics. This is because 
institutions such as the extended family and kin/
tribal groups still play an important role in the lives 
of individuals. For most, these institutions have 
become the training ground for social cooperation 
and collective action. The lessons learnt here will 
form the basis of what Hague and Harrop refer to 
as ‘basic political loyalties’, which they argue are 
formed in youth (2001:88). According to their pri-
macy model, the knowledge acquired and attitude 
and behaviour developed at younger ages will serve 
as a framework for interpreting behaviour in adult-
hood (ibid.). In AreAre, the extended family and 
kin group is also where social cooperation and col-
lective participation starts for most individuals. In 
modern politics, this institution forms the basis for 
political organisation and support (Hiriasia 2016).
Kin-based Political Support
In East AreAre constituency politics, a candi-
date’s major support is his/her kin group and this 
manifests in the way candidates win votes across 
the constituency. Outside the kin group or arata 
(tribe), the trust and loyalty needed to maintain 
political loyalty and allegiance is often missing. It is 
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 9 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2016/4
therefore common for candidates to receive most of 
their votes at home polling booths (kin territories) 
and very few beyond that. As can be seen in Figure 
4, Abraham Namokari who is from Hunanawa vil-
lage and has kin connections as far as Tawanaora 
maintained a strong support in the southern polling 
stations but little beyond Tawanaora.
The pattern of kin-based support is also likely 
to be duplicated across the constituency, with can-
didates having their kin support around them. A 
study of the election data from the 2006 and 2010 
East AreAre elections shows voting behaviour that 
confirms the kin-based political support explana-
tion. As Figure 5 demonstrates for the 2006 elec-
tions, a candidate would stand out from the rest at 
particular polling stations and then recede or even 
disappear in polling stations further from his home 
booths. This pattern is repeated across the constitu-
Figure 4: Vote counts per polling station for Abraham Namokari — 2010 elections.
Figure 5: 2006 election results showing the four candidates with the highest number of votes. 
Note: each candidate won their most votes at home polling booths
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ency. A similar voting pattern was also evident in 
the 2010 election: the inclusion of new candidates 
in 2010 did not alter the voter pattern evident from 
the previous result. This is suggestive of an estab-
lished voting behaviour.
Kin-based Resource Distribution
In kin-based politics, because most candidates rely 
on kin networks (their own and that of their cam-
paign managers) to get into parliament, in prac-
tice this means that voter support and voting pat-
terns themselves have a preponderant influence on 
resource distribution and financial assistance, rath-
er than vice versa. Resource distribution therefore 
largely reflects patterns of political support; where 
only particular parts of the constituency (mainly 
kin territories) enjoy more resources and funds 
than others. The kin-based resource distribution 
is a major feature of the kin-based politics and has 
been documented elsewhere in Melanesia. In writ-
ing about resource distribution by MPs in Western 
Highlands Province, PNG, Ketan notes that: 
Western Highlanders have come to accept 
that the spoils of office go, first, to the win-
ning candidate and his campaign team, sec-
ond, to his base vote area and, finally, to 
peripheral areas. The rationale for this prob-
ably lies in a primeval practice among kin-
based societies where the successful hunter gets 
the first bite of the game meat. (Ketan 2013:4)
Ketan alludes to a kin-based resource distribu-
tion when he uses the analogy of traditional game-
meat sharing to describe the different priorities 
given to the different factions of voters. Given that 
politicians ‘rely mainly on tribal alliances and per-
sonal networks to win elections’ (Ketan 2013:4), 
vote bases would largely be made up of kin/tribal 
members and hence prioritised for resource dis-
tribution. Ketan argues that a small sector of the 
community is likely to benefit from the resources 
accessed by winning candidates. 
 In the case of East AreAre Constituency, kin-
based resource distribution was also evident in 
the allocation of major development projects. For 
example, the hydropower projects built in East 
AreAre during the terms that Edward Huniehu 
held office (1991, 1993, 2001 and 2006) were con-
centrated in the northern end of the constituency, 
his main support base. The first hydropower project 
was built at Manawai during Mr Huniehu’s term 
from 1991 to 1996 (PGDU 1999:16). Again, three 
more hydro projects were built at Rae’ao, Nariao’a 
(the polling station for Rae’ao is also Nariao’a) and 
Masupa (incomplete) during his terms from 1998 
to 2009. Three of the four hydropower projects 
(the exception being Masupa, home to some of the 
strong contending candidates) were built in areas 
where he had strong kin and voter support. 
 In other projects (carried out under the Project 
Development Unit — PDU) implemented during 
Edward Huniehu’s term from 1991 to 1996, a total 
of SBD$172,754 was invested in Foulofo, Muki, 
Manawai and Rae’ao (all villages at the northern 
end of the constituency). Likewise, projects imple-
mented in the northern part of the constituency 
through the Development Bank of Solomon Islands 
(DBSI) within the same period, 1991–96, were 
valued at SBD$56,500. In contrast, projects imple-
mented under the PDU in the southern part of 
the constituency (Masupa, Rara) within the same 
period only amounted to SBD$28,393 and a single 
furniture project that was funded at Masupa under 
the DBSI projects (PGDU 1999).
 Most of the projects implemented during 
Edward Huniehu’s term in parliament were there-
fore concentrated in the northern part of the con-
stituency, where his main support and kin network 
was. Resource distribution in East AreAre as such is 
tied to the pattern of political support, where areas 
with strong voter support (kin bases) are likely to 
receive the bulk of funding and assistance. Most 
support bases would also be kin bases. 
Impregnable Political Units
Kin-based support proves very difficult to infil-
trate. A candidate with strong kin-based support 
complemented by good campaign managers (who 
also duplicate the kin-based support) is likely to 
hold on to the constituency seat for a long time. 
A case in point was Edward Huniehu who was 
elected in 1991, lost the seat for one term in 1997, 
was re-elected in 2001, and continued to win the 
seat until his death in 2009. Even losing candidates 
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maintained a strong kin-based support over two 
or three elections. For instance, Michael Ahikau, 
who contested strongly from 2001 to 2010, was able 
to maintain a very consistent level of support over 
three elections (East AreAre election results 2001–
10, Wood 2014b). Although there was no polling 
station data available for the 2001 election, his over-
all scores for the period indicated a consistent sup-
port base. His polling station results for the 2006 
and 2010 elections, graphed in Figure 6, point to a 
strong kin-based support at his village, Masupa. 
The overall indication is that candidates are 
able to maintain a stable kin following each election 
and they do this even without intensive gifting or 
access to state resources. These kin bases are often 
difficult to infiltrate and could remain so for more 
than two or three elections. However, past trends 
have shown that either unsuccessful candidates 
give up after two or three elections (for example, 
Abraham Namokari and Michael Ahikau) or their 
support declines when other kin candidates come 
in to compete.
Conclusion
While Solomon Islands societies do have a strong 
gifting tradition, gifting practice is seldom a means 
on its own to gain political power and authority. 
Rather, gifting in this context complements lead-
ership and consolidates relationships between kin 
members through interaction. It is this aspect of 
traditional social organisation that is seen to a larg-
er extent in the constituency politics which influ-
ences political alliances and voting behaviour dur-
ing elections.
Voting behaviour in AreAre constituency poli-
tics therefore resembles a kin-based alliance, in 
that kin groups pool their votes around a candidate 
(who also comes from the same kin group) during 
elections. These networks of kin-based alliances are 
important for political support although this does 
not mean that kin-based votes alone are sufficient 
to win elections. While candidates go into elections 
with the backing of their kin groups, those who are 
able to pick up consistent pockets of votes outside 
their kin territories have higher chances of win-
ning. Candidates therefore depend on campaign 
managers and power brokers to duplicate the kin-
based alliances in their own territories. As such, the 
role of campaign managers and power brokers has 
become increasingly important in recent elections. 
Also, because the kin-based politics have fostered 
kin-based resource distribution, non-kin supporters 
are likely to miss out on resource distribution. This 
has led to an upsurge in kin-based political rivalry 
Figure 6: 2006 and 2010 election results for Michael Ahikau.
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in the past decade. 
Finally, focusing on a single candidate and 
especially on an incumbent MP when assessing 
voter behaviour in a constituency can create a dis-
torted view of the overall behaviour of a voting 
population. Such an approach may fail to consider 
that gifting is not the only factor influencing voter 
behaviour and political alliances in a constitu-
ency. Likewise, it may also overlook factors affect-
ing the performance of candidates other than the 
incumbent MPs. This is especially relevant in the 
case of losing candidates who nevertheless perform 
strongly in elections and who maintain strong sup-
port without large budgets. In this regard, the gen-
eral voting behaviour in constituencies can only be 
satisfactorily explained using the kin-based voting 
model.
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Endnotes
1 Except for the urban centres and few alienated lands 
scattered throughout the country, in Solomon Islands, 
most of the land areas are tribally owned. This means 
that tribes have clearly defined territories and people 
are most likely to settle where they have connections 
to the land. It is common therefore for people at a 
polling station or nearby polling stations to be related 
and to have connections to one or more kin groups 
within the area. In this context, kin groups are also 
the support bases of candidates and candidates are 
likely to receive most votes in kin territories and very 
little beyond that.
2 The victims of the ‘devil’s night’ are usually those 
who for various reasons are detached from their 
kin groups or those who do not have kin candidates 
running. They are often paid over into other camps 
during the night before the election.
3 Although some scholars refer to the kin-based 
politics of Solomon Islands as ethnic politics (see 
Wood 2015), I prefer to use the term kin in that it 
makes a distinction between different tribal groups 
within a bigger group that shares the same language 
and culture (e.g. AreAre). 
4 Community schools are owned by communities 
although teachers are posted by the provincial 
or church education authorities and paid by the 
Solomon Islands Government. The building and 
maintenance of facilities are the responsibilities of the 
local community.
5 Kastom is not synonymous with the English word 
custom, as often assumed. The term refers mainly to 
Melanesian ways from before European contact. The 
term also accommodates ideas and institutions seen 
as grounded in indigenous concepts and principles. 
6 ‘Extensive’ in this case means that one has kin 
connections in the northern, central and the southern 
part of the constituency.
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